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ABSTRACT 
 
How scale and scope affect firm performance, and what this says about what the boundaries of 
the firm should be, are central questions in economics - industry studies research in particular. 
Difficulties often arise, however, in empirically assessing these effects.  Because franchised 
chains are fundamentally single-product or single-concept entities that are developed separately 
even when they belong to multi-chain firms, we use data on franchised chains to clearly 
distinguish scale from scope effects. After controlling for chain unobserved heterogeneity via 
fixed effects, we find strong evidence of positive scale effects within a chain, suggesting positive 
spillovers or network advantages from being large. For parent company scope, i.e. product 
variety measured by the number of other chains of the same parent, we find no effect on sales per 
outlet, and a negative effect on the number of outlets of a chain. We also find that ownership 
changes have no effect on sales per outlet, but reduce the numbers of outlets of the target chain 
in the following years. Overall, our findings suggest that increasing scale is beneficial to chains, 
but that multi-chain firms engage in some form of rationalization to reduce competition among 
their chains/products. 
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1. Introduction 
How does a firm’s scale of operations, and the scope of its activities, affect its 
performance and growth? Do firms benefit from mergers, takeovers and other ownership 
changes, and if so why? Under what circumstances do consumers benefit from such changes as 
well? These questions have been central concerns in industrial organization and organizational 
economics, and in microeconomics generally, as they relate to fundamental issues such as 
optimal firm boundaries, firm productivity and industry evolution.  As a result, they have 
attracted much theoretical and empirical attention. However, partly due to measurement issues, 
empirical evidence concerning the importance of scale, and even more so scope, effects on firm 
performance remains scarce. Moreover, much of the theoretical literature continues to consider 
firms as basically single product entities despite recent contributions documenting how firms 
typically produce a variety of products and an evolving mix of products over time.1
We contribute to this literature by examining how scale and scope externalities affect 
firm performance. In particular, we focus on franchised chains and analyze the impact of scale 
and scope on two measures of chain operational (rather than financial) performance. As we 
explain further below, one of these measures, namely sales per outlet, captures franchisee 
benefits to a large extent while the other, namely the number of outlets, relates more to 
franchisor performance.  
 Thus studies 
of firm scope, its variation over time, and the effects of these decisions on firm outcomes are 
particularly lagging behind. As noted by Bernard et al. (2009), “Further research is needed into 
the respective roles of firms’ intensive (how much of each product is produced) and extensive 
(how many products are produced) margins in firm growth”. 
                                                 
1 See notably Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2009), Klepper and Thompson, (2009) and Nocke and Yeaple (2006) 
for both evidence on, and models of, multi-product firms. 
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One advantage of using data on franchised chains is that they are fundamentally single-
product entities. As a result, scale and scope are more easily defined and measured in this context 
than in, say, manufacturing, where authors often must rely on broad industry classifications to 
identify and “count” the different products offered by a firm. This is not to say that franchised 
outlets sell only one product, but simply that the set of products offered is quite limited and 
intrinsically linked to the brand name. Consequently, the “menu” of products sold is chosen 
centrally by the franchisor and quite stable over time.  This means that we can measure scale 
simply using total revenues (sales) achieved in any given franchised chain. Also, though most 
franchised chains are owned by a parent company that owns nothing else, some firms own more 
than one chain (or concept). 2
Using data on the largest U.S. franchised chains and the companies that own them, we 
ascertain how the performance of individual chains, at the outlet/franchisee level and at the 
chain/franchisor level (measured by sales per outlet and the number of outlets in the chain 
respectively), is affected by the chain’s total sales (scale) and the number of other chains owned 
by the same parent company (scope), both measured at t-1.
 Some of the best-known examples of multi-chain companies 
include Choice Hotels International, which owns Comfort Inn, MainStay Suites, Econo Lodge 
and several other chains; Yum! Brands Inc., the largest fast-food restaurant company in the 
world, with brands such as KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, and others; and finally Service Brands 
International, owner of Molly Maid and Mr. Handyman. Because data on sales and number of 
outlets are still published at the chain level in various data sources, we can clearly distinguish 
chain scale from parent company scope.  
3
                                                 
2 We use the words “product” or “concept” interchangeably to mean the menu of product options offered at each 
outlet in a chain. 
 Moreover, since parent companies 
3 Our version of scope among these chains differs from that analyzed in Basker et al. (2008). In that paper, the 
authors argue that general-merchandise chains add to the scope of their stores by adding product lines when they 
grow in terms of outlets. Here the chains are more specialized, as noted above, and do not diversify the offerings at 
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often modify their scope by acquiring or selling existing chains, we also examine how ownership 
changes, as opposed to organic parent company growth, affect chain performance. 
We find that sales per outlet (or unit or store – we use these interchangeably) and the 
number of outlets in a chain are both positively related to chain sales from the last year in our 
fixed effects regressions. This suggests positive spillovers from scale, i.e. there are network 
advantages from being part of a larger chain. When it comes to scope, however, we find that 
increases in the number of other chains owned by the same parent firm have no effect on sales 
per unit, and a negative effect on the number of outlets of the chain. Since the chains owned by 
multi-chain firms tend to be in the same rather than different industries, our interpretation is that 
such firms find it beneficial to curb growth in their chains to reduce competition among them. 
Hence, our findings indicate that firms engage in some form of rationalization, a result that 
echoes findings from the gasoline retail industry where outlets have been found to be located 
further apart when a larger fraction of them in a given market are owned by the same firm (Netz 
and Taylor, 2002). Note that such opposite “within-industry” effects for scale and scope would 
be impossible to identify if, in order to measure scope, we had to rely on firm involvement in 
different industries. 
Our analyses of what occurs when chain ownership changes further support these 
findings and conclusions. Specifically, we find that ownership changes have no effect on sales 
per unit either in the short run or long run, but they have a negative effect on the chain’s number 
of units in the long run.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review related literature 
and derive implications. We then describe our data and present descriptive statistics, followed by 
                                                                                                                                                             
individual stores much at all. Instead, the firm grows in scope by diversifying into other business ideas, i.e. other 
chains. 
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the empirical model specification. We present our results in Section 4, followed by concluding 
remarks in Section 5. 
2. How Scale and Scope Can Affect Chain Performance? 
Large franchised chains are comprised of many outlets, all of which sell a “single” menu 
of products under the franchisor’s brand name. The branded nature of the product in turn implies 
differentiation across chains, and thus downward-sloping demand curves locally. In addition, 
production at the local, or outlet, level presumably entails both fixed and variable costs, and 
opening a new outlet involves some sunk cost. Under these conditions, the scale of the chain (or 
its total sales) and the scope of its parent company (or how many different products/chains the 
company owns) may affect the operational performance of a chain through either cost or 
demand. Moreover, since the chains owned by the parents tend to be in the same sector, 
increases in scale or scope may allow firms to exercise more market power locally, or deter entry 
of other chains, and thus again affect chain performance via these effects as well.  
In this section, we describe how scale and scope are expected to affect our two measures 
of chain performance, namely - sales per outlet and total outlets of a chain. We view sales per 
outlet as capturing basically store/outlet-level productivity, and thus as a likely source of benefits 
to a franchisee (i.e. the local operator). The second measure of performance, total outlets, 
represents performance benefits that are more likely to be captured by the franchisor (or parent 
company). As we discuss further in the methodology section below, our goal empirically is to 
bring evidence on the presence and overall magnitude of the scale and scope effects rather than 
identify the exact channel through which they operate. We discuss the channels separately, 
however, to better highlight the potential sources of the spillover effects. 
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2.1 Scale Effects  
2.1.1. Cost-based Arguments  
Scale may affect the performance of the chain because it reduces production costs locally. 
This could occur, for example, if the chain can better negotiate terms with suppliers as it 
becomes larger. If the chain can better negotiate with suppliers of materials, in particular, one 
would expect variable costs, and thus marginal costs, to go down. Assuming profit-maximizing 
behavior at the outlet level, the lower marginal costs should lead to lower prices (whether chosen 
by the outlet or the chain) and higher quantities sold in each outlet. Since individual outlets face 
downward sloping demand curves, we know from principles that they should operate in the 
elastic portion of the demand curve. Decreasing price then should lead to higher total revenues at 
the outlet level.  Moreover, since variable, and thus total, costs of operation are reduced, the 
chain should also find it profitable to operate more outlets in the market.4
If, in contrast, the increased scale of the chain allowed it to reduce outlet-level fixed 
costs, we would expect no short-term effect on outlet-level price or quantity. In the long run, 
however, average costs are lower so price again should go down, revenues should go up, and the 
profitability of existing outlets again should lead the chain to expand its number of outlets. In 
other words, whether scale reduces outlet-level variable or fixed costs, in the long run, the effects 
would be the same: higher sales per outlet and a greater number of outlets as well.  
  
Finally, if scale only reduced the cost of opening outlets, rather than ongoing operational 
costs, outlet-level sales should be unaffected by scale, but the number of outlets should go up 
with chain scale. 
                                                 
4 One can think either in terms of new markets where it was not profitable to open an outlet that now become 
profitable, or simply that there is “room” for more outlets in existing markets. 
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2.1.2. Demand-side Effects 
In the context of franchised chains and associated brands, it has been common to assume 
in the empirical literature that larger numbers of outlets in a chain implies more consumer 
exposure to the brand and its products. In that sense, the outlets represent a form of advertising 
that contributes to expand demand for the chain’s product.  
If chain scale indeed increases market demand, all else the same, profit-maximizing 
outlet managers should respond with higher prices and higher quantities. If price were not a 
decision variable at the outlet level, increased demand would still lead to increased quantities. In 
either case, the result would be greater sales per outlet, at least in the short run. In the long run, 
however, increased demand should lead franchisors to expand the number of outlets, which 
might ultimately bring outlet-level demand back to its original level (or even less).5
2.1.3 Entry Deterrence 
 Whether 
outlets enjoy larger sales levels in the end, or the franchisor responds mostly via increased 
number of outlets, might depend on who the beneficiary of outlet profits are. In the case of 
franchised chains, assuming the franchisor cannot modify the terms of their contracts with 
existing franchisees, they could have incentives to mostly increase the number of stores. This 
strategy would have the advantage of further increasing “advertising” and thus future sales. 
In their seminal papers, Schmalensee (1987) and Eaton and Lipsey (1979) described how, 
in spatially differentiated markets, firms may benefit from opening more than the monopoly 
profit maximizing number of outlets as a way to prevent competitors from locating nearby and 
                                                 
5  See, for example, Kalnins (2004) and Blair and Lafontaine (2005) for discussions of this issue, which is often 
referred to as encroachment in franchising. 
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driving down prices.6
2.2 Scope Effects  
  Thus entry deterrence constitutes another potential channel through which 
scale may increase firm performance. It is unclear whether outlet-level demand should go up or 
down relative to the no entry deterrence case. This is because reduced competitive entry may 
shift demand up locally, but the increased number of same-chain outlets necessary to achieve this 
outcome would have the opposite effect. Whether local demand and sales per outlet would be 
higher or lower as a result, then, depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects. Reduced 
competitive pressure, however, should entice the firm to price higher and expand further, and 
thus make it profitable to further increase the number of outlets.  
2.2.1. Cost-based Effects 
Owning several brands or chains could make it possible for a parent company to obtain 
better terms from the suppliers that sell inputs to the various chains, or to share the cost of 
different activities in the production process (e.g. marketing, distribution, customer database, 
billing or booking systems) across different chains/products. Important cost savings - especially 
when it comes to franchised chains that require training, monitoring, and other support of 
franchisees from the parent company - should in addition arise from efficiencies in management 
and related headquarters activities. Hence the impact of scope from a cost perspective should be 
similar to the one for scale above. Specifically, if variable or fixed costs of operations at the 
outlet level can be reduced by increasing the scope of the parent company, sales per outlet and 
number of outlets in the chains should both go up. If only the cost of opening outlets were 
reduced, then only the number of outlets would go up with scope. 
                                                 
6 Of course, for this entry deterrence mechanism to work, there must be some sunk cost of entry, otherwise the 
equilibrium unravels and entry deterrence cannot be achieved. See Judd (1985) on this issue. Note that Hadfield 
(1991) argues that franchising can be used to make preemption credible. 
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2.2.2. Demand-side Effects 
While the argument as to how scale might affect demand is straightforward, it is more 
difficult to see why scope, or the ownership of several chains/product concepts by a parent, 
would lead to increased demand for a different, single chain’s product. After all, most consumers 
do not know or care who owns the different chains in a parent company’s portfolio.  
There are some specific sets of circumstances, however, when one might expect to see 
positive demand spillover effects arising from scope. The first is typical of say hotel companies. 
Many hospitality firms own several chains of differing quality levels, and offer loyalty programs 
that cut across their chains.7 In that case, increased scope is much more likely to affect demand 
for the products of the chains in the parent company’s portfolio. Alternatively, in some contexts, 
parent companies find it worthwhile to co-locate branded offerings and offer “bundles” to 
consumers.   While such co-location likely yields some cost advantages, whose effects were 
described above, these practices also may yield increased demand for the chains’ products. A 
typical example from the trade literature arises in the context of the fast-food industry, where 
family members often have different preferences when it comes to dining out. A location that 
offers products from several different brands to this group of customers then has an advantage 
over the single-brand outlet.8
Whether due to loyalty programs, advantages arising from offering more choices to 
customers, or potential reputation spillovers, the presence of positive demand effects from scope 
 Finally, if the parent company owns multiple chains, the chains 
may benefit from each other’s reputations if the parent company does large-scale advertising of 
its multiple products to the same pool of customers. 
                                                 
7 For an example of how such loyalty programs work, see Deighton and Shoemaker, Hilton HHonors Worldwide: 
Loyalty Wars, HBS case #501010. 
8 Studies of agglomeration economies in the hotel industry similarly emphasize positive spillovers in terms of 
heightened demand and hotel-level performance arising among co-located hotels that belong to different hotel 
segments (e.g. Canina et al., 2005; Chung and Kalnins, 2004).   
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again should operate just as in the case of scale, namely they should lead to increased sales per 
outlet (at least in the short run) and increased numbers of outlets in the parent company’s chains.  
2.2.3. Entry Deterrence  
While the argument as to why expanding a chain aggressively to deter entry are 
straightforward, there is perhaps even more scope for entry deterrence for multi-brand firms, 
especially those that operate chains in the same industry. A firm that controls several chains in 
the same business sector for example could increase the presence of all its brands locally, 
providing customers with presumably desirable variety – or, equivalently, more outlets within 
short distances from geographically dispersed customers - while maintaining its monopoly 
power. If multi-chain firms are especially likely to benefit from entry deterrence, we would 
expect scope to have a positive impact on each chain’s number of outlets as reduced competition 
further contributes to the profitability of opening outlets locally. Note that the desire to further 
deter entry would also reinforce this effect. It is again unclear how scope would affect outlet-
level productivity or sales, however, since the firm necessarily sacrifices revenues per outlet of a 
given chain when it increases the scope of its activities and thus the number of outlets of its other 
chains locally.  
2.2.4. Market Power Effects 
When it comes to scope, the differentiated products literature suggests that another effect 
might be at work. Specifically, a firm that sells two competing products has an incentive to set 
their prices at higher levels than those that separate firms, each selling one of the products, would 
choose. For example, maximizing 
Π = p1*q1 + p2*q2 – c1(q1) – c2(q2)  
 12 
 
where q1 = a - b1p1 + b2p2 and q2 = α − β2p2 + β1p1, would yield prices that are higher than the 
prices that maximize Π1 = p1*q1– c1(q1)  and Π2 = p2*q2 – c2(q2) under the same demand 
conditions. But with higher optimal prices for the products, of course, also come lower optimal 
quantities. Fundamentally, the joint owner now internalizes the lost sales of its other product that 
result from pricing either product aggressively, so it maximizes profits by being less aggressive, 
and selling less of both products, at higher prices.9
The joint profit-maximizing problem described above yields implications not only for 
prices, which, as described below, we do not observe in our data, but also for sales per outlet and 
number of outlets per chain, which we do observe. For one thing, as suggested by Gandhi et al. 
(2008), and the literature on gasoline retailing (e.g. Netz and Taylor, 2002), chains should choose 
to locate stores further away, which in turn would translate to fewer, as opposed to more, outlets 
as parent company scope increases. The reduction in local competition would mean that existing 
outlets might benefit from higher demand, allowing them to sell more, or at least as much, at the 
higher prices induced by the merger effect. At the same time, however, a movement up along the 
same demand curve for an outlet exercising market power would reduce revenues given that 
demand is elastic at the profit maximizing point. In net, it is unclear what effect increased scope 
should have on sales per outlet, but the theory implies a negative effect for the number of outlets 
in the chain.
   
10
                                                 
9 Thomadsen (2005) finds evidence consistent with this effect. Specifically, using data on all fast-food outlets of 
McDonald’s and Burger King in Santa Clara county in California, he shows in his counterfactual experiments that 
mergers among nearby outlets, which occur as franchisees purchase existing company owned or other franchisee 
owned outlets, can have a large positive effect on prices at the merging, and other outlets in the same chain. 
 
10 There is a related literature on the effects of mergers on product variety. However, although location decisions 
affect the extent of differentiation and in that sense product variety in our setting, there is also a direct relationship 
here between location decisions and quantities sold. In Richard (1993), Berry and Waldfogel (2001), Watson (2008), 
or Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009), product variety decisions can be separated from quantity decisions. Most of 
these studies then focus on the effects of mergers on the acquiring firm’s product mix (i.e. number of products 
offered) not on changes in the quantities supplied/offered by the acquired chain, or single product entities, as we do. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and measurement  
The data in this paper are mostly from a listing entitled the Top 200 Franchise Systems, 
published annually by the Franchise Times magazine, since 1999. This annual ranking of the 
largest U.S. franchised chains – as measured by their worldwide sales in the previous year – 
gives data for up to 300 largest chains depending on the year of publication (in the main listing, 
along with an “Up and Comer” section). Specifically, given that each listing gives data for the 
previous year, we have data for the largest 225 franchised chains in 1998 and 2000, largest 200 
in 1999, largest 250 chains in 2001 and 2002, and largest 300 chains each year from 2003 to 
2007. The information provided for each chain each year includes not only the chain’s 
worldwide sales, but also its total number of outlets, and the name of its parent company. The 
latter allows us to identify ownership changes as well as obtain a measure of the parent’s other 
operations besides the chain in question. We approximate the latter using the number of other 
chains in our listings that are owned by the same parent company.11
Our unbalanced panel data set contains information concerning 502 different chains over 
a maximum period of 10 years, for a total of 2648 observations. However, since we use lagged 
explanatory variables in all our analyses, and some chains have missing sales or total units in 
some years, our final sample effectively starts in 1999 and contains 1970 or 1972 observations 
depending on the dependent variable, across 374 chains, i.e. about 5.3 observations per chain on 
average. We classify the chains among 20 sectors, described in the appendix.
  
12
                                                 
11 Parent companies also may own smaller chains not included in the top 200+ chains. However, our measure 
captures the number of major chains that they own. 
  
12 Our results remain the same if we use alternative industry classifications – see Section 4.2.  
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Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our final sample for all the variables we use in our 
empirical analyses (we explain variable measurement in more detail in the methodology section). 
It also shows that the chains in this sample are very large, with annual worldwide sales of more 
than 1.46 billion dollars on average over the period of our data, and an average of 1655 outlets 
per chain. The average sales per outlet are above 1.5 million dollars per year, but the numbers 
vary importantly within/across the chains from just $20,000 (for some cleaning services 
franchises) to $29 million (for some hotel chains). We also find much variance in the number of 
outlets per chain - some chains are very small with just 29 outlets (for a sit-down restaurant 
chain), while some are as large as 33,818 outlets (McDonald’s). These chain differences also 
suggest that controlling for unobserved chain heterogeneity will be important in our empirical 
setting.  
Because these numbers are averages calculated over almost a decade, in Figure 1 we 
show the sales per outlet, number of outlets per chain, and the number of parent’s other chains on 
average every year from 1999 to 2007. This figure suggests that despite the differences among 
the chains, the annual averages of sales per outlet and number of outlets are quite comparable 
across years in our data. Thus there is no large-scale structural break that might bias our 
analyses. The average number of other chains of the same parent varies to a greater extent over 
time, however. Because of changes in the listing’s coverage, described above, one may worry 
that some of this may be due to measurement error for this variable. We address this by 
comparing our measure, based on the sum of all the chains in our data, to a more conservative 
measure of parent’s other activities - captured by the number of Top 200 chains throughout. 
However, as Figure 1 shows, the evolution of the two measures is quite similar. Thus the 
variance in parents’ other operations over time must be due to other reasons, including changes 
in ownership, rather than changes in data coverage.  
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We explore the issue of ownership changes specifically in Figure 2, where we show the 
number of chains that experienced a parent change each year, along with their mean sales per 
outlet and total outlets. Comparing Figures 2 and 1 suggests that chains that experienced an 
ownership change have more outlets and lower sales per outlet, on average, especially later on in 
our data. In other words, the figures indicate some correlation between ownership/parent changes 
and chain size (in total outlets) or productivity (per outlet sales).  
In Figures 3 and 4, we show the kernel-density estimates of the distribution of the (log of) 
sales per outlet and number of outlets, respectively, for the top 200 chains in 1999 and then again 
in 2007. These figures first establish that there much variation in these variables across chains 
and over time. Specifically, while annual averages for both per outlet sales and chain’s total 
outlets are relatively stable over time, per Figure 1, we see in Figure 3 that the distribution of the 
(log of) sales per outlet is shifting to the right over time, and the skewness of the distribution 
goes down from 0.39 (in 1999) to 0.00 (2007). In other words, sales per outlet are increasing 
over time among several chains. This increase is to be expected, of course, since our sales data 
are in nominal dollars, but the move towards a more symmetric distribution and convergence of 
mean and median per outlet sales is intriguing. In contrast, the distribution of the number of 
outlets is quite similar in 1999 and 2007, though the small increase in skewness suggests a larger 
difference between the mean and median size of the chains in the last year of our data.  
In Table 2, we focus on the phenomenon of multi-chain ownership by parent companies 
by showing the number of chains owned by the parents in the first year of our data, in 1998, and 
then again in 2007. This table shows that most chains belong to parents that own no other chain, 
and that the distribution of chain ownership among parents has not changed much over the 
period of our data.  Since the sample contains more chains in later years, 87 chains in our data in 
1998 were owned by a parent that owned some other top chain, compared to 101 chains in 2007. 
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Still, in terms of percentages, these are quite similar - 39 vs. 34% of the chains, respectively. 
Note that from the descriptive statistics for the “Parent Change Yr Dummy Variable” in Table 1, 
ownership changes occurred in 3.7% of the observations in our data, for a total of 74 chains in 
our sample.13
While the above are just aggregate statistics, they point towards interesting dynamics 
among and within the chains. To explore whether these patterns are driven at least in part by 
spillovers from scale or scope, and, when it comes to scope, whether ownership changes matter 
separately from organic changes in the scope of a parent company’s other activities, we turn to 
an exploration of these data patterns via regression analyses below. 
 Thus large franchise chains do not change hands very frequently. Finally, though 
this is not shown in the table, we find that most multi-chain firms own chains in the same sector. 
Using the list of franchise sectors described in the Appendix, we find that those parent 
companies in our data that own more than one chain operate on average in 1.3 different sectors. 
Put differently, focusing on parents with exactly two chains, for example, we find that both 
chains are in the same sector in 78% of the cases. 
3.2 Empirical Methodology  
Our main goal is to explore whether there are spillovers (i.e. positive/negative returns) 
from scale within a chain, and/or spillovers from scope among the chains of the same parent, and 
to assess the magnitudes of these effects if they are present. In that sense, we are interested in 
overall or net spillover effects that can affect chain performance through the various channels 
described in Section 2, rather than in identifying the specific channel through which they occur. 
                                                 
13 There are two chains for which we could not reliably determine the year of ownership change and thus identify 
the year when the parent change dummy variable should equal one. Thus, we have some missing values in our 
parent change dummy variable. 
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In addition, we want to determine whether changes in parent ownership affect spillovers effects 
arising from scope. To explore all these questions we estimate chain performance as follows: 
Yit = f(Scaleit-1, Scopeit-1, Xit , Parent Changeit, Parent Changeit* Scopeit-1)exp(εit)          (1) 
where i and t index chain and year respectively. In this equation, Yit stands for one of our two 
measures of chain performance, namely: per outlet (or unit or store) sales, which we view as a 
measure of local productivity, and total outlets, which we view as a measure of total chain 
performance. Given pre-determined franchise contract terms, for franchised outlets, local 
productivity, or per outlet sales, increases will mostly accrue to franchisees. Benefits from 
increases in the chain’s number of outlets, on the other hand, are more likely to accrue to 
franchisors.  
As mentioned previously, we measure Scale in equation (1) using the total sales of the 
chain. Scope represents the impact of other chains/products that belong to the same parent, which 
we measure using the number of other chains of the same parent. Since neither type of spillovers 
need be realized immediately, we measure both scale and scope at time t-1. Thus we assume that 
if the sales of the chain increased in the previous year for some reason, this is more likely to 
impact the local productivity or total number of outlets in the chain the next rather than the same 
year. Using lags and including both explanatory variables as predetermined at time t when we 
measure chain performance also helps us avoid potential reverse causality issues that may arise 
in this type of analysis. 
To control for various types of demand shocks that may affect performance, or the timing 
of a potential ownership change, Xit includes a vector of year dummy variables and a vector of 
cross-effects between industry dummy variables and a time trend. Including these controls 
further helps to avoid potential endogeneity issues that might arise if chain performance and our 
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variables of interest were driven by common shocks.14
To examine the impact of ownership changes on chain performance, and their potential 
impact on spillovers from scope, in equation (1) we include a Parent Change dummy variable, 
and its cross effect with our measure of scope.
 Year dummy variables in particular 
control for various unobserved macro-level shocks, including inflation, changes in aggregate 
demand due to business cycles (e.g. recession or “dot.com” bubble), as well as potential political 
or regulatory changes in particular years. In addition, the industry-specific time trends control for 
potential differences in the growth rates of the industries in which the chains operate. As 
described in the data section, we classify the chains among 20 industry categories (see appendix). 
Differences in growth rates across industries during our sample period could arise for a number 
of reasons, including changes in competition, regulation, technological trends or changes in 
people’s preferences for particular products. The fact that these industry time trends are always 
jointly significant in all our specifications confirms the importance of controlling for them in our 
analyses.  
15
                                                 
14 Moreover, when using per outlet sales as our dependent variable, the impact of shocks affecting total chain sales 
as well as the number of outlets is already eliminated to a large extent by taking the ratio.  
  Moreover, to distinguish between the short-run 
and long-run impact of the change in parent, we use one of two versions of the Parent Change 
dummy variable. First, we explore the short-run effect using a dummy variable set equal to 1 in 
the year that the chain’s ownership changes, and 0 otherwise. We refer to this variable as the 
“Parent Change Yr Dummy variable”. However, since ownership changes usually take time to be 
realized and affect operational performance, we expect parent changes to potentially have an 
observable effect on the chain’s performance over a longer time period. To analyze the long run 
impact, we define a dummy variable set equal to 1 from the year of parent change onwards, and 
15 Very few chains experience multiple ownership changes during our sample period. Thus we consider only the 
impact of the first parent change observed in our data. In Section 4.3 we verify that chains with multiple ownership 
changes are not driving our results. Also, since parent changes affect only the size of parents, we consider only 
cross-effects of our Parent Change dummy with scope.  
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0 in all years before. We refer to this variable as the “From Parent Change Yr Dummy Variable”.  
In other words, this dummy variable compares the chain’s performance after the ownership 
change to its performance in the years before the ownership change. 
Since these variables comprise a mix of continuous, discrete and binary variables, to 
allow for a non-linear relationships among them, we estimate the above equation in semi-log 
form. Specifically, we include both performance and scale measures in logarithmic form, and 
estimate the impact of scale on performance in the form of an elasticity.16
We further assume that εit = µi + uit is a composite error term, where µi represents chain-
level unobserved heterogeneity correlated with our regressors. We therefore estimate all 
specifications using chain-level fixed effects.
  Whether the scale 
coefficient is smaller (larger) than one thus allows us to assess whether there are decreasing 
(increasing) returns to scale. We include the many dummy variables mentioned above, and 
scope, i.e. the number of other chains, linearly in the regressions, however. Since scope is a 
discrete variable with a very limited range of values, and most of the chains belong to parents 
with no other chain (see Table 2), its impact is best assessed in the form of a semi-elasticity, i.e. 
the percentage increase in performance due to 1 unit/chain increase in scope rather than elasticity 
(i.e. the impact of a 1% increase).  
17
                                                 
16 Though the chain’s number of outlets is a count variable, we treat it as continuous in our analyses for several 
reasons. First, we do not have any observation where this variable is 0 as would be typical for count models. Second, 
as Figure 4 shows, the distribution of the (log of) this variable is fairly close to a normal distribution. Third, as 
shown in Table 1, the dispersion of values is quite large, ranging from 29 to more than 33818 units (with a mean of 
1655 outlets). Not surprisingly then, when we estimated Poisson fixed effects models, which would be more suitable 
for a count dependent variable, the Poisson distribution was rejected in our data. 
   Controlling for chain fixed effects is very 
important in our context, as it helps to address potential endogeneity issues due to self-selection. 
More/less efficient chains may have better/worse sales performance or more/less outlets. 
17 When we estimated random effect specifications, the estimated coefficients were notably different. The 
assumption of correlated unobserved heterogeneity was also confirmed by Hausman tests, which rejected the 
random effects models. 
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Ownership changes also may be correlated with performance if new parents target more or less 
efficient chains. Moreover, chain fixed effects help to control for any other unobserved (to us) 
characteristics at the chain, industry or market level that do not change over our sample period. 
This might include, for example, characteristics such as being owned all along by a parent 
company that is better or worse at providing corporate support, having more/less mobile 
customers,18 operating in a more profitable sector or a better/worse location, or specifics of a 
chain’s ownership structure.19
Finally, since the variation in chain performance may differ across chains, and 
observations also might be serially correlated over time within chains, we adjust standard errors 
for heteroscedascity and chain-level clusters in all estimations, as recommended by Stock and 
Watson (2008).
 All these unobserved characteristics affect not only the chain’s 
performance, but also the likely presence of scale/scope spillovers. 
20
Our empirical specification can be expressed in levels as follows: 
  
    Yit = Ai *(Scaleit-1)β exp{αScopeit-1+ γParent Change it + θParent Change it* Scope it-1+ Ω‘X it-1 +uit}  (2)   
where: Ai=eµi represents the component of chain performance associated with chain unobserved 
efficiency, and any spillovers from scope, parent changes,  aggregate/industry and other shocks 
serve as performance shifters for any given scale effect. Hence, keeping all the ‘shift’ effects 
constant between t and t-1, chain performance at time t would simply be driven by chain 
                                                 
18 Brickley (1999) notes that externalities among outlets are expected to be more important in industries/products 
with more mobile/non-repeat customers (i.e. customers with lower switching costs) such as fast food than in 
industries with less mobile customers, e.g. health-care.  
19 Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) show that mature chains – as in our data - keep relatively stable mixes of company-
owned and franchised outlets. We also find that the percentage of franchised outlets is quite stable for the chains in 
our data.  
20 Stock and Watson (2008) discuss the consistency and efficiency of different estimators for standard errors in 
panel data fixed effects regressions. They recommend using clustered robust standard errors as the appropriate 
correction for serial time correlation if the panel is longer than 3 periods and when no restrictions can be placed 
on the serial correlation structure of the errors (e.g., that the errors follow a low-order moving average process). 
These conditions characterize our data.  
 
 21 
 
unobserved efficiency and scale effects, i.e. Yit = Ai *(Scaleit-1)β.  So, if we consider, for example, 
the impact of chain scale on sales per outlet, and find β=0.1, the implication is that if the chain’s 
worldwide sales were let’s say 20% higher in the previous year, this year the chain can expect 
that the outlet-level sales would be higher by about 2% on average solely due to the increased 
reputation or other demand/cost-side spillovers from scale, as discussed in Section 2.  
4. Results and Interpretation 
4.1 Baseline Specification 
Our main results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4, where Table 3 focuses on sales per 
outlet, while results in Table 4 are for the chains’ number of outlets. To better assess whether our 
estimates of scale/scope spillovers are sensitive to parent ownership changes, in both tables we 
first present results that do no incorporate any parent change dummy variables. In this case, we 
simply measure the chains scale and its parent’s scope based on who owns the chain at any given 
point in time, ignoring any differences that might result in terms of scope due to parent 
companies’ organic growth versus changes in scope of the parent company that occur due to 
ownership changes. We then show results when we introduce the year of parent change dummy 
variables, and its interaction with our measure of parent company scope. We interpret the results 
from this specification as identifying the short-term effects of ownership change. Finally, in 
column 3 of both tables, we include instead the parent change dummy variable that is set equal to 
one for the year of, and all years after, the chain becomes owned by a different parent. We 
interpret the results from this specification as showing the long-run effects of ownership changes. 
Results across all columns in Tables 3 and 4 show strong evidence of positive scale 
effects for the chains in our data. The estimated elasticities suggest that sales per outlet increase 
on average by 0.15% (cca. $2310 given a mean of $1.54M), and the total number of outlets 
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increases by 0.37% (cca. 6 outlets) this year if the chain’s total sales went up by 1% the previous 
year. As mentioned in Section 2, these positive spillover effects could arise due to positive 
demand effects or cost reductions. However, we expect that in the context of franchising, much 
of the scale effect is due to the increased visibility or reputation of the common brand, which 
then further enhances the demand for the product. However, given that the estimated elasticities 
are below one, our results also imply that returns to scale are decreasing. Hence, in the long run, 
our results imply that everything else constant, chains converge in size to chain-specific sizes.21
As for scope, the results are again very consistent across our specifications. However, in 
this case, we find no scope effect whatsoever for sales per outlet (or local productivity), and we 
find negative, rather than positive, scope effects for total units in the chain.  The latter, moreover, 
remains the same whether or not we control for parent changes. Specifically, we find that 
increasing the number of chains of the parent company last year by one reduces the number of 
outlets of the focal chain by about 1%, or 16 outlets on average, this year. Thus when the parent 
company is increasingly involved in other activities, as captured by the number of its other 
chains in the previous period, it downsizes the focal chain this period. We view this result as 
most consistent with the parent company’s likely desire to rationalize its operations, and thus 
reduce competition among the chains it owns.  An alternative explanation might be that the 
parent company devotes its limited resources to particular activities, and when it focuses more of 
these on its other chains, it does not have the resources to also grow the focal chain. This 
explanation, however, should yield a lack of growth for the focal chain, not a reduction in the 
existing number of outlets.  Instead, our results support the implications of the recent models on 
dynamics of multi-product firms that imply that there are limits to firm scope (e.g. Bernard et al., 
2009; Nocke and Yeaple, 2006; or Mitchell, 2000). 
 
                                                 
21  See Kosová and Lafontaine (2009) for more discussion on size-convergence among franchised chains. 
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Finally, in Table 3 we see that there are neither short- nor long-term effects of ownership 
changes on sales per outlet, nor any significant differences in how scope interacts with sales per 
outlet as a result of parent changes. When it comes to the total number of outlets in the chain, we 
find a significant negative effect of parent changes that is stronger in the long than the short run. 
We find no change in the strength of the scope spillover effects, however, associated with a 
parent change. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction terms between scope and the short 
and long-term parent change dummy variables are insignificant. In other words, change of parent 
company itself results in a smaller number of outlets on average by up to 7%, or about 118 (at 
the mean of 1655) outlets, for chains during the period from the year a parent change occurred 
onwards (which lasts about three years on average in our data), but it does not affect how the 
breadth of activities of the parent relate to chain size.  Put differently, focusing attention to our 
control group (i.e. years/chains without parent changes), our results imply that chains have about 
118 outlets more in those years when they do not experience a parent change. 
In sum, we have shown strong evidence of scale and scope spillovers both within and 
across chains. However, while the within-chain scale effects are positive, as expected from 
theory, the cross-chain spillover effects are negative, contrary to what one would predict from 
theoretical arguments focusing on cross-chain cost reduction or demand-enhancing effects. Since 
sales per outlet are unaffected by parent scope in our data, while the number of outlets goes 
down, we can only conclude that chain total sales go down, overall, with increases in parent 
company scope, whether this increase in scope arises organically or via ownership changes. In 
other words, belonging to a more diversified parent is detrimental for both the number of outlets 
and total sales in a chain.  
We have also shown evidence that ownership changes further reduce the number of 
outlets in the target chains directly, per the coefficient on the parent change dummy variables.  
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At the same time, the lack of impact of these dummies on sales per outlet, especially in the long 
run, also excludes the possibility that the negative impact of parent changes on total outlets is the 
result of a new parent company implementing a policy of getting rid of low performing stores. If 
this were the case, we should see that sales per outlet or local store productivity would increase 
in the years following the ownership change as the pruning (i.e. the reduction in outlets that we 
observe) occurs. In other words, we should see a positive impact of the “From Parent Change Yr 
Dummy” on sales per outlet since only efficient stores would be allowed to continue their 
operations.  Alternatively, one might assume that chains reduce the number of outlets not 
because they are getting rid of low-sales outlets, but rather of those that operate at high cost.  In 
this case, we would not expect to observe an increase in sales per outlet as a result of pruning. 
But as we discuss further in Section 4.3, the fees that franchisees (outlets) pay to their parent 
company are based on outlet sales, not profits. As a result, the parent company is unlikely to get 
rid of stores whose sales are high but profits are low because franchisees run them inefficiently. 
Similarly, for company owned stores, the chain is much more likely to replace the manager and 
put in place someone that can keep costs at the desired level, than to close down an outlet that 
generates a sufficient level of sales.  We conclude that while chains reduce the number of outlets 
as they get involved in more activities, or as take over other chains, per our data, there is no 
evidence suggesting that pruning is the motivation behind these reductions. 
Combined with the strong within-chain scale effects found in our data, our results suggest 
that the reduction in chain size will have further detrimental effects on the focal chain in the 
future. Consumers are therefore expected to be worse off as parent company scope increases. 
The parent company, on the other hand, presumably benefits from reduced competition among 
its brands, and the resulting higher prices and lower quantities (which, combined, per our results, 
lead to an overall insignificant impact on per outlet sales levels). The potentially lower quantities 
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sold per outlet, and the lower number of outlets, in turn both reduce costs.22
4.2 Robustness 
 In that sense, the 
effects found here are consistent with parent company profit maximization per Section 2.2.3. 
We have verified the robustness of the effects described above in a number of ways. 
First, we experimented with different industry classifications, using either franchising sectors 
defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce in some of its old publications on the subject, or 
using a classification from the Bond Guide on Franchising, or using 6-digit NAICS. 
Unfortunately, the latter is rather unsatisfactory as a classification system for franchised chains, 
leading to some sectors with very many observations, and many others with just one or two, 
where we could not separately identify the sectoral trends from the chain fixed effects. We 
obtained very similar results using the Bond or Department of Commerce classifications, but 
chose to rely on the classification described in the appendix.  
We show two other sets of robustness results in Tables 5 and 6, where Table 5 again 
focuses on sales per outlet, whereas Table 6 shows corresponding regressions for the total 
number of outlets in the chain. Our first set of analyses addresses the issue of the length of time-
series data available for individual chains. Since some of the chains “enter” the Top 200 listing 
late in our sample period, and others do poorly and exit the same listings after some period of 
time, we have a very unbalanced panel. In the first two columns of Tables 5 and 6, which 
correspond to columns 2 and 3 of Tables 3 and 4, we restrict our sample to just those chains with 
3 or more consecutive years of data.  As Stock and Watson (2008) discuss, for panels with just 
two years of data, the conventional heteroscedasticity-robust estimator of standard errors - 
                                                 
22 See Kalnins (2003) for evidence that when they are located near one another, outlets of the same chain price more 
aggressively than outlets of competing chains, though the latter still react to each other’s prices. Similarly, as noted 
previously, Thomadsen (2002) finds that prices in competing outlets go up, as predicted by a simple monopoly to 
merger model, when franchisees take over nearby outlets. 
 26 
 
unadjusted for clusters - is most efficient. Hence, for those chains with less than 3 observations 
each in our data, we could be overestimating standard errors in Tables 3 and 4, leading us to 
mistakenly conclude that effects are insignificant. However, the results we obtain when we focus 
on chains with three or more years of data in Tables 5 and 6 are very similar, in magnitude as 
well as significance levels, to our baseline results. We conclude that our results are unaffected by 
the fact that we have very short time periods for some of the chains in our data.  
In the next set of columns in Tables 5 and 6, we turn to an issue mentioned earlier, about 
our main measure of parent company scope (based on all chains reported in the directories), 
which may suffer from measurement error due to changes in the number of chains included in 
the listings over time. Given this, we replicated our regressions using a more conservative 
measure of scope – based only on the other Top 200 chains of the same parent. Not surprisingly, 
given what we saw in Figure 1, and the fact that the two measures are very highly correlated 
(correlation coeff. = 0.98), we again obtain results that are very consistent with our baseline 
results (see columns 3 and 4, Tables 5 and 6).  
In the next section, we address several issues to show first that our results are not driven 
by some alternative explanations and, second, to examine more closely potential mechanisms 
behind the scale and scope effects we observe. 
4.3. Exploring Alternative Explanations. 
In Table 7, we consider whether by any chance our scope measure might be omitting 
demand or reputation spillover effects, and whether this explains why we find no effect on 
outlet-level productivity combined with a negative impact of scope on total outlets. If benefits 
from scope arise from lower overhead costs at the headquarters, or better supply networks, we 
would expect they would be best captured by our current measure, namely the number of chains 
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over which the company is able to spread these costs, than by the sales of such chains, which we 
expect might relate more to demand or reputation effects than to cost savings. However, this 
alternative measure does not have any effect on either sales per outlet or number of outlets, 
directly or through interactions with our parent change dummy variables.  Moreover, the 
inclusion of this variable and its interaction terms does not change the impact of scale and scope 
we found previously.23
In Table 8, we exclude the few chains that experienced multiple parent changes during 
the period of our data. The subsample of chains that experienced just one parent change is 
interesting because the diversification literature suggests that managers may diversify into other 
activities for “managerial motives,” namely to reduce their employment risk – e.g. by showing to 
shareholders that they are doing “something”- or to increase their personal compensation. Such 
scope changes would be expected to hurt the parent company in the long run since the target 
chains neither add value to the company nor increase its profitability, but rather are meant to help 
managers fulfill their personal objectives. Alternatively, managers may underestimate the 
managerial or organizational cost of, and overestimate the benefits from, diversification and not 
realize that these costs may outweigh the benefits.  Shaver and Mezias (2009) provide some 
evidence along these lines. In either of these scenarios we would expect the chain to be resold to 
 We again find no evidence of scope effect for the chain’s sales per outlet, 
but negative scope effects for the number of outlets. And since cost savings would imply a 
positive effect of scope, as would reputation effects, we conclude that the scope spillovers in our 
data again are due to the parent companys’ desire to rationalize their network of outlets and 
reduce competition among their branded offerings rather than the result of cost efficiencies or 
increased demand. 
                                                 
23 Since the sales of parent’s other chains is a continuous variable, as is our scale measure, we include it in logs to 
measure its impact on performance in the form of an elasticity. Also, to avoid problems with taking the log of zero, 
we add 1 to the Sales of Parent’s Other Chains before taking the log. 
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another parent soon after the first parent change occurs in our sample. Thus excluding the chains 
that changed parent multiple times within our data period allows us to explore whether our 
negative scope results may be driven by such “bad” diversification decisions. Table 8, however, 
shows that our results remain the same when we exclude these few chains. We conclude that 
managerial motives and inefficient diversification activities are not driving the negative effect of 
scope on number of outlets we find in our data. 
In Table 9, we explore how the extent of franchising in the target chains may affect the 
scale and scope effects. Since royalty rates and advertising fees in franchise contracts typically 
are based on franchisee’s sales, franchisors may care more about sales than profits in franchised 
outlets.24
Since the extent of franchising does not vary much over time within chains (and thus it is 
fundamentally captured in the chain fixed effects), we examine this issue by exploring results for 
the subsample of chains in our data that franchise at least 80% of their outlets.
 They may therefore have a tendency to locate outlets closer to each other than 
corporate chains would, leading to the type of “encroachment” effect mentioned in Section 2.1.2. 
The incentives of new parent companies to reduce the size of target chains thus may be 
especially strong for chains that are more heavily franchised.  
25  Our results 
again confirm all our previous findings, and further indicate, as expected, that the negative scope 
effect on number of outlets is indeed stronger in this subsample.  This, in turn, again suggests 
that parents of franchised chains are especially interested in limiting both intra- and inter-brand 
competition among the brands they manage.26
                                                 
24 Note that the idea that franchisors could maximize outlet sales rather than profits requires that there be no 
reputation consequences from doing so, or that the franchisor not view the loss of reputation as costly. 
 
25 We use an 80% threshold because: 1) the data source already requires that a chain be at least 20% franchised to be 
included in the listing and 2) data on franchising suggest that this threshold identifies chains that are heavily 
invested in franchising (e.g. Blair and Lafontaine, 2005, p. 91 note that more than 70 percent of mature franchisors 
franchise 80% or more of their outlets). 
26 See HBS case by Khanna and Ganot, on Choice Hotels International Inc., for a nice example of these issues. 
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5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have quantified the scale and scope externalities (or spillovers) that arise 
“within” franchised chains as well as across those that are owned by the same parent company. 
Controlling for chain unobserved heterogeneity via fixed effects, we showed strong evidence of 
positive scale effects within chains. As for parent company scope, measured by the number of 
other chains owned by the parent in the previous year, we found no effect on chain-level sales 
per outlet, but a negative effect on the number of outlets. Moreover, chains that experience 
ownership changes suffer from a reduction in number of outlets in the year in which the change 
occurs and the following years as well. Combined with the lack of effect on sales per outlet, and 
the negative scope effect we document, we conclude that chain total sales go down in the long 
run when they become part of more diversified parent companies.  
Overall, our results reject the idea that increasing scope within a single parent company 
yields important efficiency gains - traditionally emphasized in the diversification literature – or 
major reputation/loyalty or entry deterrence benefits. We are left with the more standard market 
power argument as the main reason why parent companies seem to benefit from owning more 
than one product concept. In other words, chain sales, and consumers who must presumably pay 
higher prices and travel further to purchase the chain’s product, are hurt by increased scope, 
whether it is achieved organically, or via ownership changes. The parent company, on the other 
hand, might well benefit if the cost reductions attendant to lower quantities sold (at higher prices, 
given reduced competitive pressure) per outlet, and fewer numbers of outlets in the chains, 
outweigh the sales revenue reduction observed at the chain level.  We do not have data on prices 
or parent company profits to ascertain the effects on these variables empirically. But the fact that 
we find that chains may be exercising market power is surprising on its own. We did not expect 
such a finding in the type of industries where franchising occurs, given that the ease of entry and 
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relatively low switching costs between different products compared to e.g. branded products in 
manufacturing (cars, computers, etc.) that characterize these industries would seem to seriously 
hamper the exercise of market power. Yet the evidence we present is most consistent with parent 
companies taking steps to curb competition when they own more than one chain. Our results thus 
suggest that the branding that is central to franchising in fact does differentiate product offerings 
in important ways.27
Despite the very different setting of our analyses, our conclusions are quite consistent 
with Scherer’s (2006) summary in his survey of evidence on mergers, which suggests that the 
rise in mergers and acquisition activity in the U.S. does not appear to have had any positive 
effect on US productivity. Instead, as our paper suggests, even in industries where entry and exit 
is fairly low cost, firms benefit from, and thus engage in, reducing competition when they can 
profit, or expect that they could profit, from doing so. 
 
                                                 
27 See also Sutton (1995) on endogenous barriers to entry. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, REGRESSION SAMPLES (TABLES 3-4, COL. 1) 
 Levels  Log 
 obs. mean sd min max  obs. mean sd min max 
Sales per Outlet* 1970 1.54 2.33 0.021 28.9  1970 -0.12 1.02 -3.88 3.36 
Total Outlets (Worldwide) 1972 1655.3 3633.6 29 33818  1972 6.42 1.26 3.37 10.4 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 1972 1464.9 4103.5 38 56800  1972 6.24 1.30 3.64 10.9 
Scope: # of Parent's Other 
Chains(t-1) 
1972 1.37 2.48 0 12       
Alternative Scope Measures            
Scope: Sales of Parent's Other 
Chains(t-1) 
1972 2342.7 5138.7 0 30800  1972 2.89 3.92 0 10.3 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Top 
200 Chains(t-1) 
1972 1.22 2.24 0 11       
Parent Change Dummy Variables          
Short Run Effect:  
Parent Change Yr  
Dummy Var. 
 
1961 
 
0.037 
 
0.19 
 
0 
 
1 
      
Long Run Effect: 
From Parent Change Yr 
Dummy Var. 
 
1961 
 
0.11 
 
0.32 
 
0 
 
1 
      
Notes: * All sales variables are in M of dollars; Scope = 0 if there are no other chains that could generate spillovers, 
i.e. chain does not have a parent that owns other chains. We add 1 to Sales of Parent's Other Chains before taking 
logs. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF NO. OF CHAINS PER PARENT IN 1998 AND 2007. 
 Year: 1998 Year: 2007 
Number of chains  
per parent 
# of chains 
owned by 
such parent % 
# of chains 
owned by 
such parent % 
1 138 61.33 199 66.33 
2 22 9.78 26 8.67 
3 24 10.67 18 6.00 
4 12 5.33 8 2.67 
5 5 2.22 15 5.00 
6 6 2.67 18 6.00 
7 7 3.11 7 2.33 
9   9 3.00 
11 11 4.89   
Total # of Chains 225  300  
Total # of Parents 164  228  
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Note: Only the Top 200 chains are included in the graph in each of the two years. 
 
Note: Only the Top 200 chains are included in the graph in each of the years. 
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TABLE 3: SALES PER OUTLET (LOGS). FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATION, 1999-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 0.145*** 
(0.035) 
0.144*** 
(0.035) 
0.147*** 
(0.036) 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1) 0.008 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
0.009 
(0.028) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. * Scope  
 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
 
 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
 
 
0.006 
(0.032) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.*Scope  
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Year dummy variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy variables * time trend  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1970 1959 1959 
Number of Chains 374 374 374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217 0.222 0.222 
Notes: All variables in logs with the exception of dummy variables and # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1). We include 
the number of parent’s other chains linearly, since most parent companies own just one chain (see text for more 
details). Significant at: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and chain-level 
clusters in parentheses. 
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TABLE 4: TOTAL OUTLETS(LOGS). FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATION, 1999-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 0.378*** 
(0.040) 
0.377*** 
(0.041) 
0.372*** 
(0.041) 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1) -0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
-0.057** 
(0.027) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. * Scope  
 
0.002 
(0.004) 
 
 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
 
 
-0.070** 
(0.031) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.*Scope  
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Year dummy variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy variables * time trend  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1972 1961 1961 
Number of Chains 374 374 374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.430 0.436 0.439 
Notes: All variables in logs with the exception of dummy variables and # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1). We include 
the number of parent’s other chains linearly, since most parent companies own just one chain ((see text for more 
details). Significant at: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and chain-level 
clusters in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS – SALES PER OUTLET (LOGS). FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATION, 1999-
2007 
 3 or more consecutive obs. Top 200 other chains 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 0.143*** 
(0.036) 
0.146*** 
(0.036) 
0.141*** 
(0.036) 
0.145*** 
(0.036) 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1) 0.008 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. 0.009 
(0.028) 
 
 
0.010 
(0.027) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. * Scope -0.006 
(0.005) 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
 
 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
0.007 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.005 
(0.032) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.*Scope  
 
0.004 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.007 
(0.008) 
Year dummy variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy variables * time trend  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1909 1909 1959 1959 
Number of Chains 326 326 374 374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.221 0.222 0.224 0.224 
Notes: All variables in logs with the exception of dummy variables and # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1). We 
include the number of parent’s other chains linearly, since most parent companies own just one chain (see text 
for more details). Significant at: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
chain-level clusters in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS - CHAIN'S TOTAL OUTLETS(LOGS). FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATION, 
1999-2007 
 3 or more consecutive obs. Top 200 other chains 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 0.374*** 
(0.041) 
0.370*** 
(0.041) 
0.378*** 
(0.041) 
0.373*** 
(0.041) 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1) -0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. -0.057** 
(0.027) 
 
 
-0.055** 
(0.026) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. * Scope 0.002 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.005) 
 
 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
-0.067** 
(0.031) 
 
 
-0.067** 
(0.031) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.*Scope  
 
0.002 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.001 
(0.007) 
Year dummy variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy variables * time trend  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1910 1910 1961 1961 
Number of Chains 326 326 374 374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.434 0.437 0.435 0.439 
Notes: All variables in logs with the exception of dummy variables and # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1). We 
include the number of parent’s other chains linearly, since most parent companies own just one chain (see text 
for more details). Significant at: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
chain-level clusters in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7: ARE WE OMITTING DEMAND/REPUTATION SPILLOVERS? FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATION, 
1999-2007 
Dependent Variable(in logs): Sales Per Outlet Total Outlets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 0.143*** 
(0.035) 
0.146*** 
(0.035) 
0.378*** 
(0.040) 
0.373*** 
(0.040) 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1) 0.010 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
Alt. Scope: Sales of Parent's Other  
Chains(t-1) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. -0.0003 
(0.028) 
 
 
-0.036 
(0.027) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. 
* Scope 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
 
 
0.016 
(0.012) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. 
*Alt. Scope 
0.006 
(0.012) 
 
 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
 
 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
-0.011 
(0.034) 
 
 
-0.049 
(0.033) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. 
* Scope 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
 
 
0.015 
(0.010) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. 
* Alt. Scope 
 
 
0.011 
(0.009) 
 
 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
Year dummy variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy variables * time trend  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1959 1959 1961 1961 
Number of Chains 374 374 374 374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.222 0.223 0.437 0.441 
Notes: All variables in logs with the exception of dummy variables and # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1). We include 
the number of parent’s other chains linearly, since most parent companies own just one chain (see text for more 
details). Significant at: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and chain-level 
clusters in parentheses. 
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TABLE 8: EXCLUDING CHAINS WITH MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP CHANGES. FIXED EFFECT 
ESTIMATION, 1999-2007 
Dependent Variable (in logs): Sales Per Outlet Total Outlets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 0.143*** 
(0.036) 
0.146*** 
(0.036) 
0.379*** 
(0.041) 
0.374*** 
(0.041) 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1) 0.008 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. 0.005 
(0.030) 
 
 
-0.060** 
(0.030) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. * Scope -0.005 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
 
 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
0.008 
(0.035) 
 
 
-0.073** 
(0.034) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy 
Var.*Scope 
 
 
0.004 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Year dummy variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy variables * time trend  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1930 1930 1932 1932 
Number of Chains 369 369 369 369 
Adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.224 0.437 0.441 
Notes: All variables in logs with the exception of dummy variables and # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1). We include 
the number of parent’s other chains linearly, since most parent companies own just one chain (see text for more 
details). Significant at: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and chain-level 
clusters in parentheses. 
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TABLE 9:  CHAINS THAT FRANCHISE MORE THAN 80% OF OUTLETS. FIXED EFFECT ESTIMATION, 
1999-2007 
Dependent Variable (in logs): Sales Per Outlet Total Outlets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Scale: Chain's Total Sales(t-1) 0.163*** 
(0.046) 
0.170*** 
(0.045) 
0.340*** 
(0.048) 
0.330*** 
(0.046) 
Scope: # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1) 0.010 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. 0.013 
(0.041) 
 
 
-0.056** 
(0.025) 
 
 
Parent Change Yr Dummy Var. * Scope -0.006 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.004) 
 
 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy Var.  
 
0.022 
(0.049) 
 
 
-0.113*** 
(0.039) 
From Parent Change Yr Dummy 
Var.*Scope 
 
 
0.005 
(0.007) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Year dummy variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy variables * time trend  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1286 1286 1287 1287 
Number of Chains 249 249 249 249 
Adjusted R-squared 0.236 0.238 0.420 0.436 
Notes: All variables in logs with the exception of dummy variables and # of Parent's Other Chains(t-1). We include 
the number of parent’s other chains linearly, since most parent companies own just one chain (see text for more 
details). Significant at: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and chain-level 
clusters in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 
Sector Number 
of Obs. 
% Number of 
Chains 
% 
Automotive Products & Services 113 5.7 21 5.6 
Business Services 80 4.1 17 4.5 
Business Supplies 24 1.2 4 1.1 
Contractors 37 1.9 10 2.7 
Cosmetic Products & Services 47 2.4 7 1.9 
Eating Places - Full Service 262 13.3 46 12.3 
Eating Places - Limited Services 515 26.1 93 24.9 
Education 19 1.0 4 1.1 
Health & Fitness Products & Svcs 50 2.5 12 3.2 
Hotels & Motels 362 18.4 51 13.6 
Maintenance 78 4.0 17 4.5 
Personal Services 61 3.1 15 4.0 
Real Estate 33 1.7 8 2.1 
Recreation and Travel 31 1.6 7 1.9 
Rental 52 2.6 11 2.9 
Retail - Building Materials 19 1.0 3 0.8 
Retail - Food 35 1.8 9 2.4 
Retail - Home Furnishings 13 0.7 7 1.9 
Retail - Other 123 6.2 29 7.8 
Retail - Used Products 18 0.9 3 0.8 
 
